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dc.contributor.author | Martinez-Piazuelo, Juan Pablo | - |
dc.contributor.author | Quijano, Nicanor | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ocampo-Martínez, Carlos | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-03-07T12:30:19Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-03-07T12:30:19Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021-05-21 | - |
dc.identifier | doi: 10.1109/LCSYS.2021.3082865 | - |
dc.identifier | e-issn: 2475-1456 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | IEEE Control Systems Letters 6: 530-535 (2021) | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/263140 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This letter proposes a novel form of continuous-time evolutionary game dynamics for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in equality-constrained population games. Using Lyapunov stability theory and duality theory, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee the asymptotic stability, non-emptiness, compactness, and optimality of the equilibria set of the proposed dynamics for certain population games. Moreover, we illustrate our theoretical developments through a numerical simulation of an equality-constrained congestion game. | - |
dc.description.sponsorship | Juan Martinez-Piazuelo gratefully acknowledges the Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya and Banco Santander for the financial support ` of his predoctoral grant FPI-UPC. In addition, the authors would like to thank the project PID2020-115905RB-C21 (L-BEST) funded by MCIN/ AEI /10.13039/501100011033 for supporting this research. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers | - |
dc.relation | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-115905RB-C21/ES/SUPERVISION Y CONTROL TOLERANTE A FALLOS DE INFRAESTRUCTURAS INTELIGENTES BASADO EN APRENDIZAJE AVANZADO Y OPTIMIZACION/ | - |
dc.relation.isversionof | Postprint | - |
dc.rights | openAccess | - |
dc.subject | Game theory | - |
dc.subject | Optimization | - |
dc.subject | Stability of nonlinear systems | - |
dc.title | A payoff dynamics model for equality-constrained population games | - |
dc.type | artículo | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/LCSYS.2021.3082865 | - |
dc.relation.publisherversion | http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LCSYS.2021.3082865 | - |
dc.date.updated | 2022-03-07T12:30:19Z | - |
dc.contributor.funder | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya | - |
dc.contributor.funder | Banco Santander | - |
dc.contributor.funder | Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España) | - |
dc.contributor.funder | Agencia Estatal de Investigación (España) | - |
dc.relation.csic | Sí | - |
dc.identifier.funder | http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100010784 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.funder | http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 | es_ES |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | es_ES |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.openairetype | artículo | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
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2537-A-Payoff-Dynamics-Model-for-Equality-Constrained-Population-Games.pdf | 1,41 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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