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Title

A Model-to-Model Analysis of The Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: Genetic Algorithms vs. Evolutionary Dynamics

AuthorsVilà, Xavier
Keywordsagent-Based Computational Economics
Evolutionary Game Theory
Replicator Dynamics
Model-to-Model Analysis
Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma
Issue Date11-Jun-2008
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 747.08
AbstractWe study the properties of the well known Replicator Dynamics when applied to a finitely repeated version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We characterize the behavior of such dynamics under strongly simplifying assumptions (i.e. only 3 strategies are available) and show that the basin of attraction of defection shrinks as the number of repetitions increases. After discussing the difficulties involved in trying to relax the 'strongly simplifying assumptions' above, we approach the same model by means of simulations based on genetic algorithms. The resulting simulations describe a behavior of the system very close to the one predicted by the replicator dynamics without imposing any of the assumptions of the analytical model. Our main conclusion is that analytical and computational models are good complements for research in social sciences. Indeed, while on the one hand computational models are extremely useful to extend the scope of the analysis to complex scenarios hard to analyze mathematically, on the other hand formal models can be extremely useful to verify and to explain the outcomes of computational models.
Description9 pages, 5 figures.-- JEL Classification: C63, C72, D82.
Publisher version (URL)http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2008/74708.pdf
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/10508
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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