Voting by Committees with Exit

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Título:	Voting by Committees with Exit
Autor:	Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
Palabras clave:	Strategy-proofness Stability Voting Committees
Fecha de publicación:	15-may-2002
Serie:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers 511.02
Resumen:	We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1856
Aparece en las colecciones:	(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo