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On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

AuthorsMartínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; Oviedo, Jorge
Issue Date16-May-2003
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
AbstractFor the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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