Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/175165
COMPARTIR / EXPORTAR:
SHARE CORE BASE | |
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE | |
Título: | Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining |
Autor: | Nunnari, Salvatore; Zapal, Jan CSIC ORCID | Palabras clave: | Legislative bargaining Experiments Quantal response Gambler's fallacy |
Fecha de publicación: | sep-2016 | Editor: | Elsevier | Citación: | Games and Economic Behavior 99: 275-294 (2016) | Resumen: | We investigate the implications of imperfect best response—in combination with different assumptions about correct (QRE) or incorrect beliefs (Quantal-Gambler's Fallacy or QGF)—in the alternating offer multilateral bargaining game. We prove that a QRE of this game exists and characterize the unique solution to the proposer's problem—that is, the proposal observed most frequently in a QRE. We structurally estimate this model on data from laboratory experiments, and show that it explains behavior better than the model with perfect best response: receivers vote probabilistically; proposers allocate resources mostly within a minimum winning coalition of legislators but do not fully exploit their bargaining power. Incorporating history-dependent beliefs about the future distribution of proposal power into the QRE model (QGF) leads to an even better match with the data, as this model implies slightly lower shares to the proposer, maintaining similar or higher frequencies of minimum winning coalitions and similar voting behavior. | Versión del editor: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008 | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/175165 | DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008 | ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|---|
accesoRestringido.pdf | 15,38 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
CORE Recommender
SCOPUSTM
Citations
10
checked on 23-abr-2024
WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations
9
checked on 25-feb-2024
Page view(s)
249
checked on 26-abr-2024
Download(s)
84
checked on 26-abr-2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
Altmetric
Altmetric
NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.