English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/7490
Compartir / Impacto:
Estadísticas
Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Citado 190 veces en Web of Knowledge®  |  Ver citas en Google académico
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar otros formatos: Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)Exportar EndNote (RIS)
Título

Cooperation, social networks, and the emergence of leadership in a prisoner's dilemma with adaptive local interactions

Autor Zimmermann, Martin G.; Eguíluz, Víctor M.
Palabras clave Game theory
Statistical analysis
Network analysis
Numerical analysis
Fecha de publicación 16-nov-2005
EditorAmerican Physical Society
Citación Physical Review E 72, 056118 (1-15) (2005)
ResumenCooperative behavior among a group of agents is studied assuming adaptive interactions. Each agent plays a Prisoner's Dilemma game with its local neighbors, collects an aggregate payoff, and imitates the strategy of its best neighbor. Agents may punish or reward their neighbors by removing or sustaining the interactions, according to their satisfaction level and strategy played. An agent may dismiss an interaction, and the corresponding neighbor is replaced by another randomly chosen agent, introducing diversity and evolution to the network structure. We perform an extensive numerical and analytical study, extending results in M. G. Zimmermann, V. M. Eguíluz, and M. San Miguel, Phys. Rev. E 69, 065102(R) (2004). We show that the system typically reaches either a full-defective state or a highly cooperative steady state. The latter equilibrium solution is composed mostly by cooperative agents, with a minor population of defectors that exploit the cooperators. It is shown how the network adaptation dynamics favors the emergence of cooperators with the highest payoff. These "leaders" are shown to sustain the global cooperative steady state. Also we find that the average payoff of defectors is larger than the average payoff of cooperators. Whenever "leaders" are perturbed (e.g., by addition of noise), an unstable situation arises and global cascades with oscillations between the nearly full defection network and the fully cooperative outcome are observed.
Descripción 15 pages, 16 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 89.75.Hc, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s.-- PMID: 16383699 [PubMed].
Versión del editorhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.72.056118
URI http://hdl.handle.net/10261/7490
DOI10.1103/PhysRevE.72.056118
ISSN1539-3755
Aparece en las colecciones: (IFISC) Artículos
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
pre.pdf848,27 kBAdobe PDFVista previa
Visualizar/Abrir
Mostrar el registro completo
 



NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.