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Taming the Tiger: Voting Rights and Political Instability in Latin America

AuthorsColomer, Josep M.
Issue DateJul-2004
CitationLatin American Politics and Society 46(2): 29-58 (2004)
AbstractThis article discusses the relationship between certain institutional regulations of voting rights and elections, different levels of electoral participation, and the degree of political instability in several Latin American political experiences. A formal model specifies the hypotheses that sudden enlargements of the electorate may provoke high levels of political instability, especially under plurality and other restrictive electoral rules, while gradual enlargements of the electorate may prevent much electoral and political innovation and help stability. Empirical data illustrate these hypotheses. A historical survey identifies different patterns of political instability and stability in different countries and periods, which can be compared with the adoption of different voting rights regulations and electoral rules either encouraging or depressing turnout.
Description30 páginas, 1 figura, 1 tabla.-- El pdf del artículo es la versión post-print.
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2004.tb00273.x
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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