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Title

Job market signaling and employer learning

AuthorsAlós-Ferrer, C.; Prat, Julien
Issue Date2011
PublisherEcole nationale de la statistique et de l’analyse de l'information
CitationLa 1ère Journée d'Economie de l'Ensai: "Recherche, Mauvais Appariement, Entrepreneurs et Chômage" (2011)
AbstractWe consider a signaling model where the receiver is able to update his belief about the sender’s type after the signaling stage. We introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixedstrategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is fast enough.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/58819
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Comunicaciones congresos
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