English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58710
logo share SHARE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:


Endogenous Mergers and Bargaining Failures

AuthorsCaminal, Ramón ; Burguet, Roberto
Issue Date2011
PublisherEuropean Association for Research in Industrial Economics
Citation38th Annual Conference: (2011)
AbstractIn this paper we study endogenous mergers in a model of strategic bargaining. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger vary depending on the identity of the participating firms. We make two main contributions. The first is to show that relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating larger synergies and hence higher profits and higher social surplus. Our second contribution is a methodological one. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers.
DescriptionComunicación presentada tambien al "9th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference" USA 2011 y al "European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) Suecia 2011.
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Comunicaciones congresos
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Endogenous mergers.pdf195,14 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record
Review this work

WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.