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Title

Electoral competition through issue selection

AuthorsAragonés, Enriqueta ; Castanheira, Micael; Giani, Marco
Issue Date2012
PublisherBarcelona Graduate School of Economics
CitationBarcelona GSE Working Paper Series, nº 641
AbstractPolitics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters’ true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with “better” policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their “historical issues” or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.
DescriptionTrabajo presentado al "Lisbon Meeting on Institutions and Political Economy" Lisboa 2011 y al "VII Workshop on Social Decisions" Malaga 2011.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/58700
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Comunicaciones congresos
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