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dc.contributor.authorJaramillo, Paula-
dc.contributor.authorKayi, Çagatay-
dc.contributor.authorKlijn, Flip-
dc.descriptionPublicado como: Barcelona GSE Working Paper, nº 610, February 21, 2012; May 6, 2013. Publicado como: Documento de Trabajo de la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad del Rosario, nº 119, Marzo 2012 Trabajo presentado como comunicación de congreso al "3rd UECE Lisbon Meeting on Game Theory and Applications" (2011); al Workshop "Recent Developments in Market Design" (2011); al "VIII Encuentro de la Red Española en Elección Social" (2011); y al "XXXVI Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía" (2011).-
dc.description.abstractWe want to allocate an object among two agents who have property rights over the object; the dispossessed agent and the owner, and compensate the one who does not get the object. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee the participation of both agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.-
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support from Colciencias/CSIC (Convocatoria No: 506/2010), El Patrimonio Autónomo Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento para la Ciencia, la Tecnología y la Innovación, Francisco José de Caldas. Financial support from CSIC/Colciencias 2010CO0013, Plan Nacional I+D+i (ECO2011{29847), the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Government of Catalonia (SGR2009{01142).-
dc.publisherBarcelona Graduate School of Economics-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBarcelona GSE Working Paper Series, nº 610-
dc.subjectindivisible good-
dc.subjectland restitution-
dc.titleAsymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint-
dc.typedocumento de trabajo-
dc.description.versionPeer Reviewed-
Appears in Collections:(IAG) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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