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The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes

AuthorsBurguet, Roberto CSIC ORCID
Issue Date2005
CitationReview of Economic Design 9(2): 73-90 (2005)
AbstractThis paper considers the problem of designing selling procedures for substitutes (like condominium units). Oral ascending auctions for the right to choose are efficient. This is a common type of auction used for the sale of real estate. Efficiency is not optimal from the seller's viewpoint. An optimal procedure distorts the right-to-choose auction to favor in late rounds bidders whose preferred object has already been sold. This optimal auction is complex. A revenue improving departure from efficiency can be achieved by simply auctioning all the rights to choose before any of them is exerted. © Springer-Verlag 2005.
Identifiersdoi: 10.1007/s10058-005-0121-2
issn: 1434-4742
e-issn: 1434-4750
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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