English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58377
Share/Impact:
Statistics
logo share SHARE logo core CORE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE

Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:

Title

Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly

AuthorsJun, B.; Vives, Xavier
Issue Date2004
PublisherElsevier
CitationJournal of Economic Theory 116(2): 249-281 (2004)
AbstractWe compare steady states of open loop and locally stable Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) in a general symmetric differential game duopoly model with costs of adjustment. Strategic incentives at the MPE depend on whether an increase in the state variable of a firm hurts or helps the rival and on whether at the MPE there is intertemporal strategic substitutability or complementarity. A full characterization is provided in the linear-quadratic case. Then with price competition and costly production adjustment, static strategic complementarity turns into intertemporal strategic substitutability and the MPE steady-state outcome is more competitive than static Bertrand competition. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/58377
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.005
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.005
issn: 0022-0531
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
accesoRestringido.pdf15,38 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
View/Open
Show full item record
Review this work
 

Related articles:


WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.