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Title

Strategic bargaining with firm inventories

AuthorsColes, Melvin G.; Smith, E.
Issue Date1998
PublisherElsevier
CitationJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control 23(1): 35-54 (1998)
AbstractThis paper characterizes how a firm's opportunity to sell from its stock of inventories affects the outcome of strategic wage negotiations with a union of workers. In equilibrium, the union and firm share the benefits from an immediate return to work less the costs of a strike of infinite duration. This outcome is equivalent to a Nash bargaining solution in which the threat points are the agents' expected payoffs should a strike last forever. We also demonstrate that for a given level of inventories, the wage increases when demand is high. Conversely, given demand, the wage falls as inventories rise.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/58372
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00108-5
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00108-5
issn: 0165-1889
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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