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Title

Rubinstein bargaining with two-sided outside options

AuthorsPonsatí, Clara ; Sákovics, József
Issue Date1998
PublisherSpringer
CitationEconomic Theory 11(3): 667-672 (1998)
AbstractIn this note we show that if in the standard Rubinstein model both players are allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff of zero, then there exist a continuum of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes, including some which involve significant delay. We also fully characterize the case in which, upon quitting, the players can take an outside option of positive value.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/58276
DOI10.1007/s001990050208
Identifiersdoi: 10.1007/s001990050208
issn: 0938-2259
e-issn: 1432-0479
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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