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dc.contributor.author | Aragonés, Enriqueta | - |
dc.contributor.author | Postlewaite, Andrew | - |
dc.contributor.author | Palfrey, Thomas R. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-17T08:13:53Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-10-17T08:13:53Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier | doi: 10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.4.846 | - |
dc.identifier | issn: 1542-4766 | - |
dc.identifier | e-issn: 1542-4774 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of the European Economic Association 5(4): 846-884 (2007) | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58185 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We analyze conditions under which candidates' reputations may affect voters' beliefs over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. We analyze an equilibrium in which voters' strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege on their campaign promises and in which all campaign promises are believed by voters and honored by candidates. We characterize the maximal credible campaign promises and find that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation. © 2007 by the European Economic Association. | - |
dc.description.sponsorship | Palfrey and Postlewaite acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation. Aragonès acknowledges financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant number SEC2003-01961. This paper is part of the PAC Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission. | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Wiley-Blackwell | - |
dc.rights | openAccess | - |
dc.title | Political reputations and campaign promises | - |
dc.type | artículo | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.4.846 | - |
dc.date.updated | 2012-10-17T08:13:53Z | - |
dc.description.version | Peer Reviewed | - |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | es_ES |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairetype | artículo | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
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Political Reputations.pdf | 416,98 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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