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Título: | Perfect Bayesian implementation |
Autor: | Brusco, Sandro | Fecha de publicación: | 1995 | Editor: | Springer Nature | Citación: | Economic Theory 5(3): 419-444 (1995) | Resumen: | We study Social Choice Sets (SCS) implementable as perfect Bayesian equilibria of some incomplete information extensive form game. We provide a necessary condition which we call condition β. The condition is analogous to condition C that Moore and Repullo [1988] show to be necessary for subgame perfect implementation in games of complete information, and it is weaker than the Bayesian Monotonicity condition stated in Jackson [1991]. Our first theorem establishes that Incentive Compatibility, Closure and Condition β are necessary for implementation. Our second theorem establishes sufficient conditions. We show that any SCS which satisfies Incentive Compatibility, Closure and a condition called Sequential Monotonicity No Veto (SMNV) is implementable. SMNV is similar in spirit but weaker than the Monotonicity No Veto condition stated in Jackson [1991]. It is also similar to a combination of condition α and No Veto Power, which Abreau and Sen show to be sufficient for implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium. © 1995 Springer-Verlag. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58144 | DOI: | 10.1007/BF01212327 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.1007/BF01212327 issn: 0938-2259 e-issn: 1432-0479 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
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