English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58122
logo share SHARE logo core CORE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE

Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:

Optimal seigniorage and financial liberalization

AuthorsBacchetta, Philippe; Caminal, Ramón
Issue Date1992
CitationJournal of International Money and Finance 11(6): 518-538 (1992)
AbstractThis paper analyzes the effect of financial integration for countries relying on the taxation of their domestic financial system. A two-country model with overlapping generations and explicit financial intermediation is used. Goverments derive revenues from seigniorage and set optimally, but non-cooperatively, the rate of inflation and the level of required reserves on bank deposits. A financial liberalizations leads to lower reserve ratios, higher inflation rates, and larger stocks of government debt. When the liberalization is anticipated, governments may temporarily increase the reserve ratios before the liberalization occurs. (JEL F30, E60). © 1992.
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0261-5606(92)90001-E
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/0261-5606(92)90001-E
issn: 0261-5606
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
accesoRestringido.pdf15,38 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record
Review this work

Related articles:

WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.