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Título: | Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities |
Autor: | Vives, Xavier | Fecha de publicación: | 1990 | Editor: | Elsevier | Citación: | Journal of Mathematical Economics 19(3): 305-321 (1990) | Resumen: | Using lattice-theoretical methods, we analyze the existence and order structure of Nash equilibria of non-cooperative games where payoffs satisfy certain monotonicity properties (which are directly related to strategic complementarities) but need not be quasiconcave. In games with strategic complementarities the equilibrium set is always non-empty and has an order structure which ranges from the existence of a minimum and a maxinum element to being a complete lattice. Some stability properties of equilibria are also pointed out. © 1990. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58079 | DOI: | 10.1016/0304-4068(90)90005-T | Identificadores: | doi: 10.1016/0304-4068(90)90005-T issn: 0304-4068 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
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