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Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives

AuthorsPonsatí, Clara ; Sákovics, József
Issue Date1996
CitationGames and Economic Behavior 12(2): 226-244 (1996)
AbstractWe present a continuous-time model of multiperson bargaining with incomplete information, where only two agreements are possible. We show that under mild informational assumptions, players behave as if they were representing the other players who prefer the same alternative, individually playing a war-of-attrition against a conglomerate player of the opposite side. We also provide a characterization of the perfect Bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies of the game, which yields a unique outcome in most cases. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D72, D74. © 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
Identifiersdoi: 10.1006/game.1996.0015
issn: 0899-8256
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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