English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/58064
Share/Impact:
Statistics
logo share SHARE logo core CORE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE

Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:

Title

Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case

AuthorsChe, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian
Issue Date1999
PublisherElsevier
CitationEuropean Economic Review 43(4-6): 947-957 (1999)
AbstractThis paper studies the implications of buyers' liquidity constraints for the optimal selling strategy. The possibility that a buyer faces a binding liquidity constraint affects the seller's strategy in a nontrivial way. Specifically, when a seller has one unit of a good to sell to a buyer with a quasilinear utility function, the 'no-haggling' result indicates that textbook monopoly pricing is optimal, absent liquidity constraints. Introducing a potentially binding liquidity constraint vitiates the no-haggling result, and can make it strictly beneficial for the seller to use nonlinear pricing, to commit to a declining price sequence, or to require the buyer to post a cash bond.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/58064
DOI10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00107-X
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00107-X
issn: 0014-2921
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
accesoRestringido.pdf15,38 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
View/Open
Show full item record
Review this work
 

Related articles:


WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.