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Title

Measuring Regional Fiscal Transfers Induced by National Budgets

AuthorsCaminal, Ramón
Issue Date2000
PublisherSpringer
CitationInternational Tax and Public Finance 7(2): 195-205 (2000)
AbstractNational budgets typically induce a substantial redistribution of resources across regions. In this paper I propose an economic definition of such implicit fiscal transfers, which, in the absence of gains or losses out of centralizing fiscal policy, is particularly suitable for territorial equity discussions. In my view the fiscal transfer of a region is equivalent to the region's willingness to pay for achieving fiscal independence. Such implicit transfers are also characterized in the context of a model where public debt is exclusively motivated by the tax-smoothing principle. It turns out that the fiscal transfer of a region can be computed by adding the region's primary balance and an allocation of the national primary deficit according to a linear combination of the region's share of receipts and expenditures. Thus, in general the computation of these implicit transfers requires detailed information about parameter values, which may not be available in practice. Some possible solutions are discussed.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/58062
DOI10.1023/A:1008756504887
Identifiersdoi: 10.1023/A:1008756504887
issn: 0927-5940
e-issn: 1573-6970
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