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Market power and banking failures

AuthorsCaminal, Ramón ; Matutes, Carmen
Issue Date2002
CitationInternational Journal of Industrial Organization 20(9): 1341-1361 (2002)
AbstractWe investigate whether more competition in the banking industry necessarily results in a higher probability of banking failures, as it is often suggested. In our model borrowers face a moral hazard problem, which induces banks to choose between costly monitoring and credit rationing. We show that investment decreases with the lending rate and increases with monitoring effort. Since incentives to monitor are enhanced by market power, the relationship between market structure and investment is ambiguous. In the presence of non-diversifiable risk and decreasing returns to scale, more investment implies higher failure rates. As a result, the relationship between market power and banking failures is ambiguous. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/S0167-7187(01)00092-3
issn: 0167-7187
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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