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Title

Intertemporal price discrimination in frictionless durable goods monopolies

AuthorsKühn, Kai-Uwe
Issue Date1998
PublisherBlackwell Publishing
CitationJournal of Industrial Economics 46(1): 101-114 (1998)
AbstractI show that small differences in quality and production costs between durables and non-durables in a product line allow a durable goods monopolist to intertemporally price discriminate even with continuous trading. In particular, a monopolist would want to both sell and rent out a durable to achieve price discrimination. This incentive to price discriminate simultaneously creates inefficient delay in the sale of the durable good, a finite trading period and long run efficiency of the market. The Coase conjecture fails because the non-durable good acts as an outside option that guarantees a minimum profit in the market for durables.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/57880
DOI10.1111/1467-6451.00063
Identifiersdoi: 10.1111/1467-6451.00063
issn: 0022-1821
e-issn: 1467-6451
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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