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Title

Informal insurance in social networks

AuthorsBloch, Francis; Genicot, Garance; Ray, Debraj
Issue Date2008
PublisherElsevier
CitationJournal of Economic Theory 143(1): 36-58 (2008)
AbstractThis paper studies bilateral insurance schemes across networks of individuals. While transfers are based on social norms, individuals must have the incentive to comply. We investigate the structure of self-enforcing insurance networks. Network links play two distinct and possibly conflictual roles. They act as conduits for both transfers and information; affecting the scope for insurance and the severity of punishments upon noncompliance. Their interaction leads to a characterization of stable networks as suitably >sparse> networks. Thickly and thinly connected networks tend to be stable, whereas intermediate degrees of connectedness jeopardize stability. Finally, we discuss the effect of discounting on stability. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/57858
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.008
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.008
issn: 0022-0531
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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