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Title

Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement

AuthorsEliaz, K.; Ray, Debraj ; Razin, R.
Issue Date2007
PublisherElsevier
CitationJournal of Economic Theory 132(1): 236-273 (2007)
AbstractA model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While agents differ in their preferences over alternatives, everybody prefers agreement to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding valuations, differing intensities in preferences, and the option to declare neutrality to avoid disagreement. There is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus enforcing their will via both numbers and voice. However, under general conditions an aggressive minority equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large enough. Such equilibria invariably display a >tyranny of the minority>: the increased aggression of the minority always outweighs their smaller number, leading to the minority outcome being implemented with larger probability than the majority alternative. We fully characterize the asymptotic behavior of this model as group size becomes large, and show that all equilibria must converge to one of three possible limit outcomes. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/57768
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.008
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.008
issn: 0022-0531
e-issn: 1432-1270
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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