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Título: | Equilibrium binding agreements |
Autor: | Ray, Debraj CSIC; Vohra, R. | Fecha de publicación: | 1997 | Editor: | Elsevier | Citación: | Journal of Economic Theory 73(1): 30-78 (1997) | Resumen: | We study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic function, explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement. A solution concept and its applications are discussed.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C71. © 1997 Academic Press. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57647 | DOI: | 10.1006/jeth.1996.2236 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2236 issn: 0022-0531 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
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accesoRestringido.pdf | 15,38 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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