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http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57490
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Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Esteban, Joan | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ray, Debraj | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-08T10:44:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-10-08T10:44:05Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier | doi: 10.1017/S0003055401003124 | - |
dc.identifier | issn: 0003-0554 | - |
dc.identifier | e-issn: 1537-5943 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | American Political Science Review 95(3): 663- 672 (2001) | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57490 | - |
dc.description.abstract | According to the Olson paradox, larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests. We address the issue in a model with three distinctive features: explicit intergroup interaction, collective prizes with a varying mix of public and private characteristics, and nonlinear lobbying costs. The interplay of these features leads to new results. When the cost of lobbying has the elasticity of a quadratic function, or higher, larger groups are more effective no matter how private the prize. With smaller elasticities, a threshold degree of publicness is enough to overturn the Olson argument, and this threshold tends to zero as the elasticity approaches the value for a quadratic function. We also demonstrate that these results are true, irrespective of whether we examine group sizes over the cross-section in some given equilibrium or changes in the size of a given group over different equilibria. | - |
dc.description.sponsorship | Esteban acknowledges the financial support of Fundación Pedro Barrié de la Maza and research grant DGICYT PB96-0897. Ray acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation and a John Simon Guggenheim Fellowship. | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | - |
dc.rights | openAccess | - |
dc.title | Collective action and the group size paradox | - |
dc.type | artículo | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0003055401003124 | - |
dc.date.updated | 2012-10-08T10:44:05Z | - |
dc.description.version | Peer Reviewed | - |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | es_ES |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.openairetype | artículo | - |
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Collective Action.pdf | 113,79 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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