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Title

Bargaining over multiple issues with maximin and leximin preferences

AuthorsMármol, Amparo M.; Ponsatí, Clara
Issue Date2008
PublisherSpringer
CitationSocial Choice and Welfare 30(2): 211- 223 (2008)
AbstractGlobal bargaining problems over a finite number of different issues are formalized as cartesian products of classical bargaining problems. For maximin and leximin bargainers we characterize global bargaining solutions that are efficient and satisfy the requirement that bargaining separately or globally leads to equivalent outcomes. Global solutions in this class are constructed from the family of monotone path solutions for classical bargaining problems. © 2007 Springer-Verlag.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/57447
DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0227-2
Identifiersdoi: 10.1007/s00355-007-0227-2
issn: 0176-1714
e-issn: 1432-217X
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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