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Título: | Bargaining one-dimensional social choices |
Autor: | Cardona, Daniel; Ponsatí, Clara CSIC | Fecha de publicación: | 2007 | Editor: | Academic Press | Citación: | Journal of Economic Theory 137(1): 627- 651 (2007) | Resumen: | We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q ≥ 2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player's utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry, the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities, q > n / 2, provided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity condition. Asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing only the monotonicity condition. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57445 | DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.001 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.12.001 issn: 0022-0531 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
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Bargainingone-dimensional.pdf | 659,67 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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