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Título: | A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures |
Autor: | Ray, Debraj CSIC; Vohra, R. | Fecha de publicación: | 1999 | Editor: | Elsevier | Citación: | Games and Economic Behavior 26(2): 286- 336 (1999) | Resumen: | Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilibriumcoalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain conditions) an equilibrium coalition structure. Our characterization results are especially sharp forsymmetricpartition functions. In particular, we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a Cournot oligopoly.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72, C78, D62. © 1999 Academic Press. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57434 | DOI: | 10.1006/game.1998.0648 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.1006/game.1998.0648 issn: 0899-8256 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
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