Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57378
COMPARTIR / EXPORTAR:
SHARE CORE BASE | |
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE | |
Título: | Ambiguity in election games |
Autor: | Aragonés, Enriqueta CSIC ORCID ; Postlewaite, Andrew | Fecha de publicación: | 2002 | Editor: | Springer Nature | Citación: | Review of Economic Design 7(3): 233- 255 (2002) | Resumen: | We construct a model in which the ambiguity of candidates allows them to increase the number of voters to whom they appeal. We focus our analysis on two points that are central to obtain ambiguity in equilibrium: restrictions on the beliefs that candidates can induce in voters, and intensity of voters' preferences. The first is necessary for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist, while the second is necessary for ambiguity in equilibrium when there exists a Condorcet winner in the set of pure alternatives (e.g. the spatial model of electoral competition), and when candidates' only objective is to win the election. In this last case, an ambiguous candidate may offer voters with different preferences the hope that their most preferred alternative will be implemented. We also show that if there are sufficiently many candidates or parties, ambiguity will not be possible in equilibrium, but a larger set of possible policies increases the chance that at least one candidate will choose to be ambiguous in equilibrium. © Springer-Verlag 2002. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57378 | DOI: | 10.1007/s100580200081 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.1007/s100580200081 issn: 1434-4742 e-issn: 1434-4750 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Ambiguity in Election Games.pdf | 320,12 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
CORE Recommender
SCOPUSTM
Citations
37
checked on 22-abr-2024
Page view(s)
313
checked on 24-abr-2024
Download(s)
265
checked on 24-abr-2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
Altmetric
Altmetric
NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.