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http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57372
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Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Heifetz, Aviad | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ponsatí, Clara | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-05T10:23:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-10-05T10:23:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier | doi: 10.1007/s00182-006-0065-y | - |
dc.identifier | issn: 0020-7276 | - |
dc.identifier | e-issn: 1432-1270 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | International Journal of Game Theory 35(4): 521- 538 (2007) | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/57372 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Why is issue-by-issue bargaining a common phenomenon, even though it disallows the beneficial trade-offs across issues that are possible when negotiating a global solution? We show that under asymmetric information, issue-by-issue bargaining has two attractive features. First, it avoids bundling a good deal on one issue with a bad deal on another issue, when the lack of gains to agreement on the latter is not a priori common knowledge. Second, it avoids the imposition of the asymmetric information inefficiency of >harder> issues on issues which turn to be >easier> to solve. That's why when the agenda is not imposed on the parties but is rather left for them to determine when negotiating, they may very well opt for issue-by-issue bargaining. We demonstrate this in a natural game where bargainers communicate, whenever they choose to do so, their willingness to discuss or make offers either on one of the issues or on a bundle of issues. © 2007 Springer Verlag. | - |
dc.description.sponsorship | Support from the Hammer fund for Economic Cooperation to Aviad Heifetz is gratefully acknowledged. Support from Projects CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 by the European Comission and SEJ2006-02079 by MEC, and from CREA-Barcelona Economics to Clara Ponsati is gratefully acknowledged. | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Springer Nature | - |
dc.rights | closedAccess | - |
dc.title | All in good time | - |
dc.type | artículo | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00182-006-0065-y | - |
dc.date.updated | 2012-10-05T10:23:14Z | - |
dc.description.version | Peer Reviewed | - |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | es_ES |
item.openairetype | artículo | - |
item.grantfulltext | none | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
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