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http://hdl.handle.net/10261/44718
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Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Cardona, Daniel | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ponsatí, Clara | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-01-25T12:23:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-01-25T12:23:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011-02-02 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Games and Economic Behavior 73(1): 165–75 (2011) | es_ES |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/44718 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferences represented by continuous, concave and single-peaked utility functions, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterization. The uniqueness of the equilibrium permits an analysis of the set of Pareto optimal voting rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks and uniform recognition probabilities unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. | es_ES |
dc.description.sponsorship | Financial support from Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencia (ECO2009-08820, ECO2009-06953, and CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010-CSD2006-00016), the Generalitat de Catalunya through grant SGR2009-1051 and Barcelona-GSE Research is gratefully acknowledged. | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | es_ES |
dc.rights | closedAccess | es_ES |
dc.subject | One-dimensional bargaining | es_ES |
dc.subject | Single-peaked preferences | es_ES |
dc.subject | Pareto optimality | es_ES |
dc.subject | Quota rules | es_ES |
dc.title | Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules | es_ES |
dc.type | artículo | es_ES |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.006 | - |
dc.description.peerreviewed | Peer reviewed | es_ES |
dc.relation.publisherversion | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.006 | es_ES |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | es_ES |
item.openairetype | artículo | - |
item.grantfulltext | none | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
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