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Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules

AuthorsCardona, Daniel; Ponsatí, Clara
KeywordsOne-dimensional bargaining
Single-peaked preferences
Pareto optimality
Quota rules
Issue Date2-Feb-2011
CitationGames and Economic Behavior 73(1): 165–75 (2011)
AbstractWe consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferences represented by continuous, concave and single-peaked utility functions, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterization. The uniqueness of the equilibrium permits an analysis of the set of Pareto optimal voting rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks and uniform recognition probabilities unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule.
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.006
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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