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Título

Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules

AutorCardona, Daniel; Ponsatí, Clara
Palabras claveOne-dimensional bargaining
Single-peaked preferences
Pareto optimality
Quota rules
Fecha de publicación2-feb-2011
EditorElsevier
CitaciónGames and Economic Behavior 73(1): 165–75 (2011)
ResumenWe consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferences represented by continuous, concave and single-peaked utility functions, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterization. The uniqueness of the equilibrium permits an analysis of the set of Pareto optimal voting rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks and uniform recognition probabilities unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule.
Versión del editorhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.006
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/44718
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.006
ISSN0899-8256
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