Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/39889

COMPARTIR / EXPORTAR:

SHARE BASE	Comparte tu historia de Acceso Abierto
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC \| Dublin Core \| RDF \| ORE \| MODS \| METS \| DIDL \| DATACITE
Refman EndNote Bibtex RefWorks Excel CSV PDF DataCite Send via email

Título:	Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
Autor:	Diamantoudi, Effrosyni; Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Xue, Licun
Palabras clave:	Externalities Cooperative game theory Shapley value Linked issues
Fecha de publicación:	1-ago-2011
Citación:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers 880.11
Resumen:	We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.
Descripción:	JEL classification: C71, D62
Versión del editor:	http://ideas.repec.org/p/aub/autbar/880.11.html
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/39889
Aparece en las colecciones:	(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo