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Title

Single-dipped preferences

AuthorsBarberà, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
KeywordsStrategy-proof
Group strategy-proof
Binary range rules
Single-dipped
Issue Date31-Dec-2009
CitationUFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 801.09
AbstractWe characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules defined on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the rules' range. We show that when all single-dipped preferences are admissible, the range must contain two alternatives at most. But this bound changes as we consider different subclasses of single-dipped preferences: we provide examples of subdomains admitting strategy-proof rules with larger ranges. We establish exact bounds on the maximal size of strategy-proof functions on each of these domains, and prove that the relationship between the sizes of the subdomains and those of the ranges of strategy-proof functions on them need not be monotonic. Our results exhibit a sharp contrast between the structure of strategy-proof rules defined on subdomains of single-dipped preferences and those defined on subsets of single-peaked ones.
DescriptionJEL classification: D71
Publisher version (URL)http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2009/80109.pdf
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/35502
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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