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dc.contributor.authorBarberà, Salvador-
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-05T12:13:33Z-
dc.date.available2011-05-05T12:13:33Z-
dc.date.issued2010-01-19-
dc.identifier.citationUFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 828.10es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/35321-
dc.descriptionBarcelona Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper nº 420es_ES
dc.description.abstractThis paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumuraes_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.rightsopenAccesses_ES
dc.subjectStrategy-proofnesses_ES
dc.subjectSocial Choicees_ES
dc.subjectDominant Strategieses_ES
dc.subjectDomain Restrictionses_ES
dc.subjectVotinges_ES
dc.titleStrategy-proof social choicees_ES
dc.typedocumento de trabajoes_ES
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer reviewedes_ES
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://pareto.uab.es/wp/2010/82810.pdfes_ES
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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