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Title

Strategy-proof social choice

AuthorsBarberà, Salvador
KeywordsStrategy-proofness
Social Choice
Dominant Strategies
Domain Restrictions
Voting
Issue Date19-Jan-2010
CitationUFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 828.10
AbstractThis paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura
DescriptionBarcelona Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper nº 420
Publisher version (URL)http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2010/82810.pdf
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/35321
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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