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Título: | On Cooperative Solutions of a Generalized Assignment Game: Limit Theorems to the Set of Competitive Equilibria |
Autor: | Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro | Palabras clave: | Assignment game Core Set-wise stability Competitive equilibrium |
Fecha de publicación: | 5-mar-2010 | Citación: | UFAE and IAE Working Papers ; 810.10 | Resumen: | We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff. | Descripción: | JEL Classification Codes: C78; D78 | Versión del editor: | http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2010/81010.pdf | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/35138 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo |
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