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dc.contributor.authorAlonso-Paulí, Eduard-
dc.contributor.authorPérez-Castrillo, David-
dc.date.accessioned2008-03-03T18:14:02Z-
dc.date.available2008-03-03T18:14:02Z-
dc.date.issued2008-02-16-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/3142-
dc.description.abstractWe study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipWe gratefully acknowledge the financial support from projects SEJ2006-00538-ECON, 2005SGR-00836, Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-00016 and Barcelona Economics-Xarxa CREA.en_US
dc.format.extent340014 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUFAE and IAE Working Papersen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries726.08en_US
dc.rightsopenAccessen_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subjectIncentivesen_US
dc.subjectMoral Hazarden_US
dc.subjectMatching modelen_US
dc.titleCodes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets for Managersen_US
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoen_US
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer revieweden_US
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