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| Título: | A payoff dynamics model for equality-constrained population games |
Autor: | Martinez-Piazuelo, Juan Pablo; Quijano, Nicanor; Ocampo-Martínez, Carlos CSIC ORCID | Palabras clave: | Game theory Optimization Stability of nonlinear systems |
Fecha de publicación: | 21-may-2021 | Editor: | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers | Citación: | IEEE Control Systems Letters 6: 530-535 (2021) | Resumen: | This letter proposes a novel form of continuous-time evolutionary game dynamics for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in equality-constrained population games. Using Lyapunov stability theory and duality theory, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee the asymptotic stability, non-emptiness, compactness, and optimality of the equilibria set of the proposed dynamics for certain population games. Moreover, we illustrate our theoretical developments through a numerical simulation of an equality-constrained congestion game. | Versión del editor: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LCSYS.2021.3082865 | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/263140 | DOI: | 10.1109/LCSYS.2021.3082865 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.1109/LCSYS.2021.3082865 e-issn: 2475-1456 |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | (IRII) Artículos |
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| 2537-A-Payoff-Dynamics-Model-for-Equality-Constrained-Population-Games.pdf | 1,41 MB | Adobe PDF |  Visualizar/Abrir |
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