English   español  
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/25686
logo share SHARE logo core CORE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE

Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:

Gradual learning and the evolution of cooperation in the spatial Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma

AutorJiménez, Raúl; Lugo, Haydée; San Miguel, Maxi
Palabras claveDecision theory and game theory
Structures and organization in complex systems
Fecha de publicaciónsep-2009
CitaciónEuropean Physical Journal B - Condensed Matter 71(2): 273-280 (2009)
ResumenThe usual mechanism for modeling learning in spatially structured evolutionary games has to date been imitation of some successful neighbor. However, it seems natural that individuals hesitate to imitate their neighbor’s acts, specially if they can imply high costs. Here we study the effect of incorporating resistance to imitation on these models. Our framework is the spatial Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma. For this evolutionary game, it has been reported that occasional errors in the imitation process can explain the emergence of cooperation from a non-cooperative initial state. In this work, we show that this only occurs for particular regimes of low costs of cooperation. Furthermore, we display how resistance gets greater the range of scenarios where cooperative individuals can invade selfish populations. In this context, where resistance to imitation can be interpreted as a general rule of gradual learning, our results show that the less that is learnt in a single step from a successful neighbors, the larger the degree of global cooperation finally attained. In general, the effect of step-by-step learning can be more efficient for the evolution of cooperation than a full blast one.
Descripción13 pages, 7 figures.-- PDF pre-print.
Versión del editorhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1140/epjb/e2009-00287-y
ISSN1434-6028 (Print)
1434-6036 (Online)
Aparece en las colecciones: (IFISC) Artículos
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato  
EPJB090348.pdf2,65 MBAdobe PDFVista previa
Mostrar el registro completo

Artículos relacionados:

NOTA: Los ítems de Digital.CSIC están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.