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New Attack Strategy for the Shrinking Generator

AutorCaballero-Gil, P.; Fúster-Sabater, A.; Pazo-Robles, M.E.
Palabras claveCryptanalysis
Stream Cipher
Fecha de publicaciónmay-2009
EditorAustralian Computer Society
CitaciónJournal of Research and Practice in Information Technology
Serievol. 41, (2)
ResumenThis work shows that the cryptanalysis of the shrinking generator requires fewer intercepted bits than that indicated by the linear complexity. Indeed, whereas the linear complexity of shrunken sequences is between A ⋅ 2(S-2) and A ⋅ 2(S-1), we claim that the initial states of both component registers are easily computed with less than A ⋅ S shrunken bits. Such a result is proven thanks to the definition of shrunken sequences as interleaved sequences. Consequently, it is conjectured that this statement can be extended to all interleaved sequences. Furthermore, this paper confirms that certain bits of the interleaved sequences have a greater strategic importance than others, which may be considered as a proof of weakness of interleaved generators.
DescripciónACM Classification: E.3 (Data Encryption), B.6.1 (Design Styles)
Versión del editorhttp://www.jrpit.acs.org.au/jrpit/JRPITVolumes/JRPIT41/JRPIT41.2.181.pdf
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