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Title

The stability of multi-level governments

AuthorsAragonés, Enriqueta ; Ponsatí, Clara
KeywordsMulti-level governments
Repression
Issue DateJan-2021
PublisherSage Publications
CitationJournal of Theoretical Politics 33(1): 140-166 (2021)
AbstractThis paper studies the stability of a multi-level government. We analyze an extensive form game played between two politicians leading two levels of government. We characterize the conditions that render such government structures stable. We also show that if leaders care about electoral rents and the preferences of the constituencies at different levels are misaligned, then the decentralized government structure may be unsustainable. This result is puzzling because, from a normative perspective, the optimality of decentralized decisions via a multi-level government structure is relevant precisely when different territorial constituencies exhibit preference heterogeneity
Publisher version (URL)https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820984852
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/228556
ISSN10.1177/0951629820984852
0951-6298
E-ISSN1460-3667
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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