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Title

Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining

AuthorsZapal, Jan
KeywordsEndogenous status-quo
Dynamic bargaining
Legislative bargaining
Spatial collective choice
Equilibrium existence
Issue DateJun-2020
PublisherElsevier BV
CitationEuropean Journal of Political Economy 63: 101816 (2020)
AbstractThe paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Players bargain over policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo; the status-quo is endogenous. The construction relies on simple strategies determined by strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm we provide. A strategic bliss point, the dynamic utility ideal, is a moderate policy relative to a bliss point, the static utility ideal. Moderation is strategic and germane to the dynamic environment; players moderate in order to constrain the future proposals of opponents. Moderation is a strategic substitute; when a player's opponents do moderate, she does not, and when they do not moderate, she does. We provide conditions under which the simple strategies induced by the strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm deliver a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium, and we prove its existence in generic games with impatient players and in symmetric games. Because the algorithm constructs all equilibria in simple strategies, we provide their general characterization, and we show their generic uniqueness.
Publisher version (URL)http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/224451
DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816
Identifiersdoi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101816
issn: 0176-2680
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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