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Title

Pledge and implement bargaining in the Paris Agreement on climate change

AuthorsCaparrós Gass, Alejandro
KeywordsBargaining Theory
Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Global Warming
Issue DateMay-2020
PublisherConsejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (España)
CitationInstituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicas (IPP) CSIC, Working Paper. 2020-05
AbstractThis paper analyzes a multilateral bargain game motivated by the Paris Agreement on climate change. Countries submit pledges, which can be revoked although this implies reputational costs. Pledges, which do not need to be accepted by other countries, detail intended abatement efforts and can be conditional or unconditional, according to whether they depend on transfers. As the process is repeated, incomplete long-term provisions are also considered. The analysis shows the conditions under which, despite its weakness, the Paris Agreement can bring the world to the first best, or at least closer. It also details how to improve the current agreement.
Publisher version (URL)http://ipp.csic.es/es/workpaper/pledge-implement-bargaining-paris-agreement-climate-change
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/223028
Appears in Collections:(CCHS-IPP) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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