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Título

How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?

AutorBrañas-Garza, Pablo; Morales, Antonio J.
Palabras clavePrisoner's dilemma
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Social conflict
Fecha de publicación5-may-2004
SerieIESA Working Paper Series
WP 07-04
ResumenIn this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in different categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.
DescripciónA previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Revisiting Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma”.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/2106
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