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Título : How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?
Autor : Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Morales, Antonio J.
Palabras clave : Prisoner's dilemma
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Social conflict
Fecha de publicación : 5-may-2004
Serie : IESA Working Paper Series
WP 07-04
Resumen: In this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in different categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.
Descripción : A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Revisiting Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma”.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2106
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