How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?

Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2106

COMPARTIR / EXPORTAR:

SHARE BASE	Comparte tu historia de Acceso Abierto
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC \| Dublin Core \| RDF \| ORE \| MODS \| METS \| DIDL \| DATACITE
Refman EndNote Bibtex RefWorks Excel CSV PDF DataCite Send via email

Título:	How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?
Autor:	Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Morales, Antonio J.
Palabras clave:	Prisoner's dilemma Payment cards Social conflicts
Fecha de publicación:	5-may-2004
Serie:	IESA Working Paper Series WP 07-04
Resumen:	In this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in different categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.
Descripción:	A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Revisiting Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma”.
URI:	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2106
Aparece en las colecciones:	(IESA) Informes y documentos de trabajo