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Título : Reciprocity, Matching and Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games
Autor : Croson, Rachel; Fatás, Enrique; Neugebauer, Tibor
Palabras clave : Experimental economics
Public goods
Voluntary contribution mechanism
Weakest link mechanism
Reciprocity
Fecha de publicación : 2004
Serie : IESA Working Paper Series
WP 09-04
Resumen: Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences in the voluntary provision of public goods. A number of competing models of such preferences have been proposed. We provide evidence for one model of behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional cooperation). Consistent with previous research, we find that participants in the voluntary contribution mechanism attempt to match the contributions of others in their group. We also examine participants in a related game with different equilibria, the weakest-link mechanism. Here, in contrast, participants contribute so as to match the minimum contribution of others in their group.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2103
Aparece en las colecciones: (IESA) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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