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dc.contributor.authorFatás, Enrique-
dc.contributor.authorNeugebauer, Tibor-
dc.contributor.authorTamborero, Pilar-
dc.date.accessioned2007-11-14T08:37:05Z-
dc.date.available2007-11-14T08:37:05Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/2101-
dc.description.abstractThe present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is taken to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects exist but that expertise may weaken the deviation from rational choice.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipAuthors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Generalitat Valenciana (code CTIDIA/2002/208) and Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (code BEC2002-04380-C02-01).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIESA Working Paper Seriesen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWP 10-04en_US
dc.rightsopenAccessen_US
dc.subjectSubject pool effecten_US
dc.subjectSubject surrogacyen_US
dc.subjectExpected utility theoryen_US
dc.subjectProspect theoryen_US
dc.titleHow Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experimenten_US
dc.typedocumento de trabajoen_US
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042es_ES
item.openairetypedocumento de trabajo-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.languageiso639-1en-
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