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http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2101
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Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Fatás, Enrique | - |
dc.contributor.author | Neugebauer, Tibor | - |
dc.contributor.author | Tamborero, Pilar | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-11-14T08:37:05Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2007-11-14T08:37:05Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2101 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is taken to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects exist but that expertise may weaken the deviation from rational choice. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | Authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Generalitat Valenciana (code CTIDIA/2002/208) and Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (code BEC2002-04380-C02-01). | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | IESA Working Paper Series | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | WP 10-04 | en_US |
dc.rights | openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Subject pool effect | en_US |
dc.subject | Subject surrogacy | en_US |
dc.subject | Expected utility theory | en_US |
dc.subject | Prospect theory | en_US |
dc.title | How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment | en_US |
dc.type | documento de trabajo | en_US |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 | es_ES |
item.openairetype | documento de trabajo | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IESA) Informes y documentos de trabajo |
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10-04.pdf | 110,92 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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